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Social transmission of information is a key phenomenon in the
evolution of behaviour and in the establishment of traditions
and culture. The diversity of social learning phenomena
has engendered a diverse terminology and numerous ideas
about underlying learning mechanisms, at the same time that
some researchers have called for a unitary analysis of social
learning in terms of associative processes. Leveraging previous
attempts and a recent computational formulation of associative
learning, we analyse the following learning scenarios in some
generality: learning responses to social stimuli, including
learning to imitate; learning responses to non-social stimuli;
learning sequences of actions; learning to avoid danger. We
conceptualize social learning as situations in which stimuli
that arise from other individuals have an important role in
learning. This role is supported by genetic predispositions that
either cause responses to social stimuli or enable social stimuli
to reinforce specific responses. Simulations were performed
using a new learning simulator program. The simulator is
publicly available and can be used for further theoretical
investigations and to guide empirical research of learning and
behaviour. Our explorations show that, when guided by
genetic predispositions, associative processes can give rise to a
wide variety of social learning phenomena, such as stimulus
and local enhancement, contextual imitation and simple
production imitation, observational conditioning, and social
and response facilitation. In addition, we clarify how
associative mechanisms can result in transfer of information
and behaviour from experienced to naive individuals.
1. Introduction
Social learning—learning from others—is a key phenomenon in
the evolution of behaviour and in the origin of traditions and
culture. At the individual level, social learning helps naive
& 2019 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits
unrestricted use, provided the original author and source are credited.
individuals acquire information from more experienced individuals, resulting in behaviours that have
positive outcomes or result in avoidance of negative ones. This saves time and energy and reduces
individual risk, ultimately enhancing survival and reproduction (e.g. [1–3]). At the group level, social
learning enables the transmission of behaviour between individuals and across generations, thus
providing the opportunity for the establishment of traditions (sensu [4]) and other cultural phenomena [5–12].
Through decades of research, a wide array of social learning phenomena have been described in many
animal groups (e.g. [7,11,13–15]), and controversy has ensued regarding both the social learning abilities of
non-human animals (hereafter: animals) and the learning mechanisms that underlie the phenomena. At one
extreme, social learning in animals is claimed to require no special capacity and to be accounted for by
associative learning (e.g. [16–19]). At the other extreme, animal social learning is considered cognitively
advanced, almost human-like (e.g. [20,21]). In addition, social learning phenomena are described using a
dauntingly diverse terminology, such as stimulus and local enhancement, emulation, social facilitation
and imitation. Some regard these terms as identifying different learning mechanisms (e.g. [11,12,22–24]),
while others consider them as merely descriptive, with the phenomena themselves amenable to
explanation through just a few associative mechanisms [13,25–27]. Setting controversy aside, the diverse
social learning terminology reflects a genuine diversity of possibilities for social learning. For example,
an animal may simply notice the presence of others, it may observe the behaviour of others or outcomes
of behaviours, and it may observe what objects others are interacting with. In addition, an animal can
use these observations in many ways, such as to approach or avoid objects and other animals, or to try
out other behaviour. Lastly, social information can be available in many contexts, such as when
encountering novel objects, when foraging, or when learning about predators.
This diversity notwithstanding, the adaptive value underlying social learning is that inexperienced
individuals can learn to behave more efficiently by using social information from experienced individuals.
This information transfer is the main focus of our paper, in particular, when it results in naive individuals
behaving similarly to experienced individuals. More specifically, we explore the extent to which the social
transmission of productive behaviour can be supported by associative learning processes. We first discuss
the nature of social information, and then we introduce our model, in which associative learning is guided
by genetic predispositions [28]. This model, closely related to optimization algorithms in machine learning
that are commonly used in, for example, ‘deep learning’ studies [29], can learn optimal behaviour in
ecologically relevant circumstances. Furthermore, the model has previously been shown capable of
producing ‘intelligent’ behaviour, such as tool use, self-control and planning [28,30]. Drawing inspiration
from Cecilia Heyes’ extensive work (e.g. [25,27,31]), we ask whether the model can be a satisfactory
account of social learning phenomena in animals. We will not analyse in detail specific datasets, but rather
investigate whether the model can reproduce the kind of phenomena that are usually included in social
learning taxonomies, using as a benchmark the taxonomy by Hoppitt & Laland [11]. We will conclude
that associative learning can account for a surprising array of social learning phenomena. In the
Discussion, we consider how our model relates to other analyses of social learning.
2. Material and methods
There is a rich terminology for the roles of the individuals involved in social learning. The recipient of social
information may be called the observer, the young or the naive individual. The provider of social
information may be called the model, the demonstrator, the teacher or the experienced individual. In this
paper, we use the terms ‘learner’ for the first individual and ‘experienced’ animal for the second. With
these terms, we intend to emphasize the possibility of information transfer from one individual to the
other, without implying that such transfer is deliberate, nor invariably adaptive.
2.1. The nature of social observations and the correspondence problem
A simple definition of social learning is that an individual can learn based on stimuli that originate, at least in
part, from other individuals [25,27]. We refer to these as ‘social stimuli’ and treat them like any other
stimulus. For example, one animal may observe another eating a fruit, and thereby learn that the fruit
is worth eating. In this case, the other animal and its actions provide social stimuli, while the fruit is a
non-social stimulus. Typically, observers perceive stimulus compounds that contain both social
and non-social elements. We can write such a compound stimulus simply by listing its components





where S is the complete stimulus, Ssocial is a social element of interest and SxSy. . . represent other stimulus
elements, social or non-social. In the previous example, Ssocial would represent stimuli originating from the
observed animal, Sx from the fruit it was eating and Sy. . . from other parts of the environment. Most social
learning situations involve observing a sequence of stimuli with social elements. Consider, for example, an
individual that performs behaviour B towards stimulus S, resulting in a second stimulus S0. We write such a
sequence as
S! B! S0, (2:1)
where we have used the convention that stimuli are in italic and behaviours in roman type. An example
sequence is
Fruit! Eat! Sweet:
When such a sequence is observed by another individual, the stimuli are typically not the same, but they are
related. We use brackets to indicate an observer’s perception, rather than the perceptions and actions of the
individual that performs the sequence. For example, [Eat] refers to the perception of another individual
eating. Thus, when perceived by another individual, equation (2.1) becomes
Ssocial[S]! Ssocial[B]! Ssocial[S0], (2:2)
where Ssocial refers to observer’s perception of the other individual. In equation (2.2), we have indicated the
presence of social stimuli with Ssocial, but in many situations, it is important to distinguish between different
social stimuli, such as a particular display indicating danger rather than the simple presence of another
individual. The complexity of social observations will increase further if a sequence of behaviour is
considered rather than a single response.
Note that stimuli and actions may be more or less similar from the point of view of the observer and
observed individual. Thus, while [Fruit] can bear strong similarity to Fruit, [Sweet] and Sweet will not
resemble each other at all: Sweet is a gustatory sensation, while [Sweet] indicates the consequences of
this sensation that are visible to others, if any. Likewise, the stimuli experienced while performing the
behaviour Eat are altogether different from [Eat], which refers to the perception of others eating. In
other words, to be effective, the social learner must somehow bridge the gap between its own
perspective and that of other individuals [32]. This is referred to as the ‘correspondence problem’ in
the social learning literature [33,34]. As hinted above, the correspondence problem applies to varying
extent. The stimulus situation experienced by the observer is never completely identical to the
situation of the experienced animal, but while sometimes the differences are minor, other times they
are substantial. Moreover, it may not always be obvious what stimulus another individual may be
responding to. Proposed mechanisms for social learning need to explain how the correspondence
problem may be solved.
2.2. Associative learning
Associative learning is commonly recognized as a key element in animals’ adaptation to their
environment, when innate knowledge is insufficient. For example, associative learning can generate
appropriate anticipatory behaviour to stimuli of biological significance, can lead to the discovery of
new food sources and can improve foraging efficiency by perfecting innate behavioural programmes
[35,36]. Nevertheless, associative learning is sometimes viewed as ‘mindless’ and unable to produce
complex behaviour (e.g. [37–41]). This characterization stands in contrast with recent, dramatic
demonstrations in artificial intelligence, in which associative learning systems (coupled with
sophisticated perceptual processing and other algorithmic elements) have displayed human-level
performance in complex games such as chess, Go and others (e.g. [42–44]). We have previously
shown that associative learning, augmented with suitable genetic predisposition, can produce flexible
and sophisticated behaviour such as tool use, self-control and appropriate reactions to violations of
expectation [28]. In this section, we summarize our model of associative learning, referring to Enquist
et al. [28] for a full account and to Sutton and Barto [42] and Wiering [45] for its foundation in
artificial intelligence. In the following sections, we will explore its application to social learning.
Social learning phenomena include both learning about stimuli (Pavlovian learning, e.g. predator
recognition) and learning about actions (instrumental learning, e.g. learning a foraging technique).
Furthermore, social learning includes phenomena in which Pavlovian and instrumental learning





(§3.5). It is, therefore, paramount to use a model of associative learning that accounts simultaneously for
Pavlovian and instrumental learning. In our model, a first equation models learning about the value of
stimuli (related to conditioned reinforcement in experimental psychology), while a second equation
models learning about the value of actions (stimulus–response (S-R) associations), which is possibly
informed by learned stimulus values. Finally, a third equation models how action values are used in
decision-making. To introduce the model formally, consider a sequence such as equation (2.1), in
which an animal experiences a stimulus S, responds with behaviour B, chosen from the animal’s
repertoire, and then experiences an outcome S0. As a consequence of these experiences, the model
updates two quantities. One is w(S), which is the estimated value of stimulus S, i.e. the animal’s
estimate of how much reward it can expect to collect after experiencing S. The second is v(S! B),
which is the estimated value of reacting with B to stimulus S, i.e. the animal’s estimate of the reward
it can collect after responding with B to S. Formally, the memory updates are as follows:
Dv(S! B) ¼ av[u(S0)þ w(S0) v(S! B)]
and Dw(S) ¼ aw[u(S0)þ w(S0) w(S)]:

(2:3)
The first equation models S-R, instrumental learning. In this equation, the S-R value v(S! B) is updated
so as to become closer to the total reinforcement value of S0. The latter is u(S0) þ w(S0), where u(S0) is the
innate reinforcement value and w(S0) the learned value. This equation is similar to standard error-
correction equations such as the Rescorla and Wagner model [46], with the difference that
reinforcement values are explicitly partitioned into an innate and a learned part. The second equation
updates the stimulus value w(S) in the same way, i.e. bringing it closer to the total value of S0. Note
that this update depends only on which stimulus S0 follows stimulus S and not what response B was
performed. In this sense, the second equation models response-independent Pavlovian processes.
Parameters av and aw regulate the rate at which the two kinds of memories are updated (learning rates).
The last equation of the model implements decision-making with a ‘softmax’ rule. Namely, upon
experiencing stimulus S, the model chooses behaviour B with probability
Pr (S! B) ¼ exp (bv(S! B))P
B0 exp (bv(S! B0))
: (2:4)
Parameter b regulates the amount of exploration: if b ¼ 0 all behaviours are equally likely, whereas if b is
large only the behaviour with the highest v value will be selected with appreciable probability. In all
simulations below, we use values av ¼ 0.1, aw ¼ 0.1 and b ¼ 1. All graphs report averages of 1000
simulations, apart from the avoidance learning example that reports average values for 2000 simulations.
A crucial feature of the model is that it enables learned stimulus values (w values) to modify S-R
values (v values) and thus to reinforce instrumental responses. In the present scope, this mechanism is
important for social stimuli to influence behaviour, as we discuss in §3.4. More generally, stimulus
value learning makes the model capable of learning sequences of actions. It can be proved that, given
enough experiences, the model learns the correct v and w values for stimuli [28] and thus
approximate the optimal course of action.
Social learning situations frequently include complex stimuli composed of both social and non-social
elements, such as when observing a conspecific manipulating a fruit or other potential food sources. To
handle such situations in the model, we proceed in a similar way as in classic models of associative
learning, such as the Rescorla and Wagner model [46]. Namely, we assume that the v value of a
compound stimulus is computed as the sum of the v values of its components
v(S1S2 . . . Sn ! B) ¼
Xn
i
v(Si ! B): (2:5)
The same sum rule applies to the u and w values of stimuli, such as in u(S1S2) ¼ u(S1) þ u(S2). We also
assume that an experience with the compound stimulus leads to learning about each of its components,
according to
Dv(Si ! B) ¼ av[u(S0) v(S1S2 . . . Sn ! B)] (2:6)
and similarly for w values. These simple assumptions about stimulus compounds are adequate in the
cases we discuss below. The current approach can be refined, when needed, to include such factors as





2.3. Modelling social learning in terms of associative processes
In a model of social learning that seeks to appeal only to general associative processes, social and non-
social stimuli are processed and learned about in exactly the same way. Thus, technically, there is nothing
special about social learning in such a model [19,25,27]. At the same time, social learning situations are
often more complex than better-known associative learning scenarios such as simple Pavlovian and
instrumental conditioning. We will see below that an associative account of social learning requires
specifying the learning scenario in detail, similarly to how learning of complex behaviour is analysed
in the Skinnerian tradition [47–49]. This includes identifying which social and non-social stimuli are
experienced, which behaviours can be performed, what are the consequences of behaviour, what are
the reinforcement values of stimuli, and so on. Previous experiences may also be important, which in
our model are summarized by starting with non-zero initial v values for some S-R pairs, and with
initial w values for some stimuli. We will also take into account various kinds of genetic
predispositions, as highlighted by the ethological tradition [50–52], and by psychological theories that
have sought to frame learning within its biological background [53–55]. Genetic predispositions are
likely to play a crucial role in social learning through such mechanisms as attributing high salience to
social stimuli and favouring specific responses to social stimuli [25,27,56]. We will see below how
such predispositions can be included in our model (see [28, table 2], for a general discussion).
We acknowledge from the outset that associative learning does not directly accomplish some of the
most sophisticated social learning faculties. For example, it does not contain a dedicated mechanism to
solve the correspondence problem in general. Rather, the correspondence problem is solved mainly on a
case-by-case basis, as we will see below, although extensive training may provide some more general
abilities (see §4.3). Furthermore, our model does not remember observed behavioural sequences,
implying that it cannot immediately imitate unknown sequences. It is unclear, however, whether these
limitations imply that associative learning is insufficient to understand non-human social learning, as
it is a matter of debate whether animals possess general solutions to the correspondence problem, and
whether they can immediately imitate action sequences (cf. [57,58]). It is also uncertain whether
natural selection would favour the evolution of learning mechanisms dedicated to social learning, as
general learning mechanisms such as associative learning can optimize behaviour in response to social
stimuli [28,42]. We do not seek to resolve these issues completely, although we touch upon them in
the Discussion. Rather, the examples we present below aim to illustrate how associative learning can
provide a mechanism for social learning that is plausible and requires minimal assumptions.
3. Results
3.1. Diversity of social learning scenarios
The many possibilities for observing social and non-social stimuli imply a wealth of social learning
scenarios. Consider, for example, a succession of two stimuli, S! S0, which is the observational part
in the elementary sequence S! B! S0 based on which our model learns (equation (2.1)). Consider
further just one social stimulus, Ssocial, one non-social stimulus, Sx, and their compound SsocialSx. From
these stimuli we can form 3  3 ¼ 9 possible successions, such as SsocialSx! Sx, Sx! Ssocial, or Sx!
SsocialSx. If we consider one more stimulus, either social or non-social, we can form seven
combinations, and thus 49 possible successions. Even more possibilities arise if we consider the fact
that social learning scenarios often include more than two steps, each of which may or may not
include social stimuli [27,59]. The diversity of potential social learning scenarios may partly explain
the vast terminology that has been created to describe social learning, and the controversy regarding
whether learning in different scenarios is supported by different learning mechanisms.
Below we apply associative learning to five social learning scenarios, summarized in table 1. The first
three involve learning of a single response and consider only S-R learning (v values). The other cases
consider also stimulus value learning (w values) and explore how the combination of instrumental
and Pavlovian learning can support social learning of behavioural sequences and of danger
avoidance. In setting the stage for this analysis, we would like to stress that the most impressive cases
of social learning concern behavioural sequences rather than single responses. For example, birds that
learned to feed from milk bottles in England learned a sequence that included recognizing milk
bottles, approaching them, piercing the metal foil cap and finally drinking the cream [60,61]. Learning






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the one summarized above, that can learn behavioural sequences and that can make testable predictions
about how such learning proceeds.
3.2. Learning a response to a social stimulus
Learning a response to a social stimulus may not always be considered social learning, but it serves as a
useful introduction to modelling social learning with associative processes. Consider a social stimulus
Ssocial that the observer does not respond to initially. This stimulus could be the presence of another
individual in a particular context or a behaviour performed by a conspecific. If some action B towards
this stimulus is reinforced, the observer will become more likely to respond with B the next time it
encounters Ssocial. This simple scenario involves only two kinds of behaviour sequences
Ssocial ! B! Sreward
and Ssocial ! 0! Sno reward,

(3:1)
where 0 summarizes all responses other than B. We can model this acquisition process by
standard instrumental learning, using only the first learning rule in equation (2.3) as no learning of
w values (Pavlovian learning) is required. Thus, the S-R value of performing B towards Ssocial is
updated according to
Dv(Ssocial ! B) ¼ av[u(Sreward) v(Ssocial ! B)]: (3:2)
A simulation of this learning process is presented in figure 1. Figure 1a shows that the probability of
responding is initially small, but not zero. Once responding starts to occur, response probability
increases quickly, eventually reaching an equilibrium value close to 1. Figure 1b shows the underlying
changes to memory. The S-R association v(Ssocial! B) grows and approaches 25, which is the value of
the reinforcer, u(S0). The S-R association between the social stimulus and not responding, v(Ssocial!
0), remains unchanged as this response is not reinforced.
This account is no different from standard instrumental learning, and the use of any behaviour can be
modified in this way. This includes behaviour directed towards another individual such as social,
aggressive or sexual behaviour; and other behaviours that may be elicited by the social stimulus.
For instance, a young individual may learn to avoid older and stronger individuals if or when
the latter behaves aggressively. This can be thought of as either decreased responding towards a
negative stimulus (an aggressive conspecific) or increased responding towards a positive stimulus
(reaching safety).
Learning to respond to social stimuli can also account for how an animal may learn to imitate single
behaviours [27]. The essence of this account is that an observer can associate different responses to
different social stimuli. For example, a conspecific that performs two distinct behaviours, B1 and B2,
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Figure 1. Learning to respond to a social stimulus in the situation described in equation (3.1). Panel (a) shows how probability of
responding changes as a function of number of learning opportunities. Panel (b) shows the underlying changes to memory,
specifically the values v(Ssocial! B) and v(Ssocial! 0), where ignore stands for behaviour other than B. See electronic





to [B1] and with B2 to [B2] would then be learning to imitate these behaviours, at least from an operational
point of view (figure 2). This explanation is consistent with Heyes’ [31] remark on imitation in birds, both
wild-caught [63,64] and laboratory reared [65,66]. Namely, Heyes concluded that ‘the imitated body
movements were part of the relevant species’ natural foraging repertoire, and the subjects were
accustomed to feeding in flocks. Therefore, it is possible that they had learned to imitate these
movements during group feeding prior to the experiments. Somewhat surprisingly, the model
predicts that animals with smaller behavioural repertoires are more likely to learn to imitate. In fact,
all else being equal, the likelihood that an individual will learn to use the same behaviour as another
is greater in species with a smaller repertoire, simply because there are fewer behaviours to choose
from (see also §3.4 for discussion on combinatorial matters). Animals with large behavioural
repertoires, such as primates, may have difficulty in discriminating between similar motor patterns,
and will also try out more behaviours during learning, both of which may lead to them eventually
adopting a different behaviour than the observed one. A quail or a reptile, in contrast, will have many
fewer options in both observations and choice of behaviour. This circumstance may explain the mixed
result obtained in imitation studies in primates (e.g. [20,58,67]).
The plausibility of the examples given above depends strongly on whether a suitable reinforcer can be
realistically assumed. For example, a pigeon that pecks or scratches the ground when it sees other
pigeons pecking or scratching is likely to be reinforced by finding food, and thus can plausibly learn
to imitate these behaviours. Similarly, a hummingbird may plausibly learn to avoid flowers where
another hummingbird is foraging, because it may find no nectar there or because it may be attacked
by the other bird. Explanations of this kind are less immediate when it comes to the imitation of
arbitrary motor patterns with no immediate consequences. It should be borne in mind, however, that
social stimuli can themselves function as reinforcers, so that behaviour can be reinforced if it leads to
being in the proximity of conspecifics or to interacting with them [68–70].
We conclude by noting that the scenario discussed in this section—learning to respond to
social stimuli—is probably of limited importance for understanding sophisticated social learning. For
example, learning S-R reactions to social stimuli cannot establish a general imitation ability because
imitating each behaviour would have to be learned separately. Moreover, in this kind of learning, the
learned behaviour is triggered by the presence of the social stimulus, and it will not occur when the
learner is on its own. Thus, learning a response to a social stimulus cannot support behaviour when
the learner is alone. At the same time, we will see below that responses to social stimuli (learned or
innate) can be important to learn responses that are performed when the learner is alone.
3.3. Learning to respond to non-social stimuli
Here, we consider how learning triggered by a social stimulus can facilitate the acquisition of behaviour that
persists even when the social stimulus is absent. For example, consider a young herring gull that approaches















































Figure 2. Learning to imitate individual behaviours. Social observations contain stimulus elements emerging from two different
behaviours, B1 and B2. Repeating the behaviour just observed is rewarded. Panel (a) shows how the probability of responding
to observations of B1 changes as a function of number of exposures. Panel (b) shows the underlying changes to memory. The





example, by access to the food, it can lead the young to approach the food even in the absence of the
experienced individual. A breakdown of this scenario is as follows. The experienced gull provides
the social stimulus Ssocial, while the unknown food provides the non-social stimulus Sx. When the
experienced gull is feeding, the two stimuli are experienced as the compound SsocialSx. Let B stand
for approach behaviour. We assume that the young initially approaches conspecifics, which we model
as v(Ssocial! B) . 0. We also assume that the initial value of approaching the unknown food is zero,
v(Sx! B) ¼ 0. When the young gull approaches the experienced one, its experience can be written as
SsocialSx ! B! S0, (3:3)
where S0 is the consequence of approaching. To calculate the effects of this experience, we use the learning
equations for compound stimuli, equations (2.5) and (2.6). Thus, the value of approaching Sx is updated
according to
Dv(Sx ! B) ¼ av[u(S0) v(SsocialSx ! B)] (3:4)
¼ av[u(S0) (v(Ssocial ! B)þ v(Sx ! B))]: (3:5)
The tendency to approach the food will increase if Dv(Sx! B) . 0, that is, if the reward experienced after
approaching, u(S0), is larger than the current value of approaching the compound stimulus SsocialSx, that
is, v(Ssocial! B) þ v(Sx! B). This may happen, for example, because S0 may be perceived as valuable
due to proximity to the conspecific, or because after approaching the young bird gains access to the
novel food. (Strictly speaking, the latter possibility involves a sequence of actions, which we will
consider in the next section.)
The effect of social experiences with SsocialSx is thus to increase v(Sx! B), which leads to increased
approach probability even when the food is encountered in the absence of conspecifics. If social
experiences are interspersed with non-social experiences with the food alone, then it will be easier for the
young to learn to approach the new food source. We refer to this as transfer learning because behaviour
learned in a social context transfers to a non-social context. Transfer experiences are important to
consolidate responding to X alone. This effect is illustrated in figure 3 when the young encounters Sx
alone 80% of the time, and SsocialSx the remaining 20%. This situation is compared to non-social learning
in which the young only encounters Sx, which results in slower acquisition than in the social learning
situation. The effect of social experiences ranges from very significant to negligible depending on model
parameters, such as the amount of exploration (determined by b in equation (2.4)), and the prevalence of
experienced individuals (which determines the probability of observing SsocialSx).
These scenarios may apply widely, that is, when social experiences bootstrap learning that
subsequently is completed through non-social experiences. For example, instead of learning to
approach novel food, an individual can learn to approach a specific location, such as a shelter or
foraging grounds. In these cases, the learner may end up using the same behaviour employed by
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Figure 3. Learning to respond to a non-social stimulus through social learning. Panels (a) and (b) compare social learning (solid
line) with individual learning (hatched line). Panel (a) shows how probability of responding changes as a function of number of
learning opportunities, and panel (b) shows the underlying changes to memory. See electronic supplementary material for





Rather, the role of social observations is to draw the learner in contact with the same reward
contingencies as those perceived by the experienced animals. Thus, behavioural similarity is not the
product of direct imitation: the learner has still to explore on its own the different behavioural
options. Such exploration can be facilitated by genetic predispositions. For example, recognizing that
the experienced animal is feeding may bias the learner to use behaviours that are relevant to feeding,
among which will be the behaviour that the experienced animal is using.
Learning a response to a non-social stimulus can also be facilitated by pre-existing social responses.
Assume that there are 10 possible behaviours, B1, . . ., B10 and that these can give rise to identifiable
stimuli [B1], . . ., [B10]. Consider now a situation in which an experienced animal uses B1 in response to
stimulus Sx, such that learners observe the compound [B1]Sx. As before, Sx occurs alone with
probability 0.8 and the compound stimulus with probability 0.2. We compare two situations. In one
situation, the individual can imitate B1 before the start of the simulation, i.e. they respond with B1 to
[B1]. This response may be genetically predisposed or learned as in the preceding section. In the other
situation, the individual lacks this ability and instead starts to explore behaviours within its repertoire
with equal frequencies. Simulations show, not surprisingly, that productive responding towards Sx is
established faster in individuals capable of imitating B1 as shown in figure 4.
3.4. Learning a behaviour sequence
A careful examination of social learning phenomena often reveals that the final outcome is a sequence of
behaviours guided by a succession of stimuli, rather than a single response to a single stimulus. In one of
the examples above, a young gull learned to approach novel food, but in order to benefit from this
behaviour the gull must also learn to handle and consume the food. In sequence learning, social
learning is often combined with individual learning. For example, in the case of small birds learning
to feed from milk bottles mentioned in §3.1 [60], birds were attracted to milk bottles by the presence
of other birds, and then learned individually to pierce the foil cap and skim the cream floating atop
of the milk [71]. We speculate that many social learning phenomena are variants of this kind of
sequence learning, such as stimulus and local enhancement, emulation and opportunity providing
(see §4.2). In this section, we explore how social observations can facilitate the acquisition of
productive behaviour sequences through associative learning.
There are two main difficulties in learning behavioural sequences. One is that there are many more
possibilities to explore than when learning single responses. An animal with a repertoire of n behaviours,
for example, can try out nl behaviour sequences of length l. This exponential growth in exploration time
as a function of sequence length, easily makes learning too time consuming to be worthwhile. We
consider this difficulty towards the end of this section. The second difficulty is that, typically, the initial
steps of a sequence are unrewarded. For example, approaching milk bottles is necessary to exploit them
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Figure 4. Transmission of behaviour though imitation. A learner sees an experienced animal perform a behaviour B in response to
stimulus Sx. If the learner imitates B, it is more likely to also respond to Sx with B, which facilitates learning when B is rewarded. If
the learner does not imitate B, learning proceeds more slowly by simple trial and error. Panel (a) shows the probability of
responding to Sx with B with and without the ability to imitate B. Panel (b) shows the underlying changes to memory. See





conditioned reinforcement and response chaining [28,36,72,73]. Conditioned reinforcement is a Pavlovian
process (in that it is independent of the animal’s actions) in which stimuli that anticipate reinforcement
acquire themselves reinforcing properties [73,74]. Chaining refers to the fact that single responses can be
linked together to form behaviour sequences. In learning to exploit milk bottles, for example, a lucky
bird may have happened to perch on the bottle and pecked at the cap, or found an open cap, and thus
gained access to the milk. This would have had two consequences: a strengthening of the S-R association
between seeing the cap and pecking, and a growth in the conditioned value of seeing the cap. The latter
means that, on successive experiences, approaching the cap would have felt rewarding, by virtue of
conditioned rather than of primary reinforcement. The conditioned value of seeing the cap would have
then reinforced approaching milk bottles.
In our model, conditioned reinforcement takes the form of stimulus value learning (w values in
equation (2.3)), and chaining emerges because learned stimulus values act as reinforcers to increase or
decrease S-R values (v values in equation (2.3)). In this section, we use the model to exemplify how
social observations can facilitate the acquisition of productive sequences. We consider cases in which a
sequence of two behaviours is required to obtain a reward
Sx ! B1 ! Sy ! B2 ! Sreward: (3:6)
For example, this sequence may describe a gull approaching (B1) a food truck (Sx) and taking (B2) a paper
bag (Sy) to feed on the chips (Sreward) inside
Food Truck! Approach! Paper Bag! Take! Chips:
As in the previous section, we assume that a naive bird initially approaches conspecifics (Ssocial), but not
Sx, the food truck. We also assume that the gull initially does not take Sy, the paper bag. Given this set-
up, the social learning scenario is as follows. Initially, the naive bird is attracted to the truck by the
presence of conspecifics. That is, stimulus SsocialSx elicits approach (B1) because the S-R value v(Ssocial
! B1) is high. Thus, the naive gull experiences the sequence SsocialSx! B1! SsocialSy. This experience
strengthens the tendency to approach the truck. Formally, v(Sx! B1) increases because SsocialSx! B1
is followed by the rewarding stimulus SsocialSy (see §3.3). In turn, approaching the truck often may
lead the learner to autonomously learn the response Sy! Sreward. Thus, S-R learning can strengthen
both approaching the truck and taking the paper bag. It is crucial to note, however, that S-R learning
is not enough for autonomous performance of the whole sequence. In fact, in the absence of
conspecifics, the first step, Sx! B1! Sy is not rewarding. Performing this step would, with time, lead
to a decrease of v(Sx! B1), and the gull would stop approaching the truck. With conditioned
reinforcement, on the other hand, Sy itself can become a rewarding stimulus, and thus continue to
reward approach to the truck even in the absence of social rewards. There are, in fact, two kinds
of experiences that endow Sy with conditioned reinforcement value. First, the gull can itself perform
Sy! B2! Sreward. This causes an increase in w(Sy) according to equation (2.3),
Dw(Sy) ¼ aw[u(Sreward) w(Sy)]:
Second, when in proximity of the truck, the learner can witness experienced gulls taking paper bags and
feeding on the chips, corresponding to the sequence of stimuli SsocialSy! Ssocial[B2]! Ssocial[Sreward].
Embedded in this sequence is the succession Sy! Ssocial[B2] which endows Sy with conditioned value,
again according to equation (2.3),
Dw(Sy) ¼ aw[u(Ssocial) w(Sy)],
where, for simplicity, we have assumed that perceiving B2 is not rewarding, i.e. u([B2]) ¼ 0. Once Sy has
acquired conditioned value, it can reinforce and maintain approach to Sx even in the absence of social
stimuli. According to equation (2.3), the full learning equation for v(Sx! B1), when the learner is alone, is
Dv(Sx ! B1) ¼ av[u(Sy)þ w(Sy) v(Sx ! B1)],
meaning that v(Sx! B1) is driven towards the positive value w(Sy), even if Sy is not a primary reinforcer
(u(Sy) ¼ 0). We show in figure 5 that this scenario can lead to an impressive speed-up of learning,
compared to the case in which there are no social stimuli. Learning of the sequence could have
proceeded even more quickly, if the learner had previously learned to imitate B2, for example, via the
route explored in §3.2. In the simulation, the learner encounters Sx alone (food truck without
experienced gulls) 80% of the time and SsocialSx (food truck with other gulls) the remaining 20% of the





to Sx and Sy in the absence of social stimuli. As noted in §3.3, individual learning experiences are important
to achieve a full transfer of the newly acquired skill from a social to a non-social context.
In summary, here social stimuli facilitate learning because they promote the build-up of conditioned
reinforcement to intermediate stimuli in the sequence, and because they initially attract the animal
towards a situation (the food truck) that would otherwise be ignored. The first factor amounts to
modifying the reward structure of the sequence, so that even steps that do not lead to primary
reinforcement can be reinforced. The second factor is an example of what we have labelled an ‘entry
pattern’ (see [28], for details), which refers to where in a sequence an animal is likely to find itself.
Consider a generic sequence
S1 ! B1 !    ! Sl ! Bl ! Sreward:
If the animal always starts from the first step, and if no rewards are perceived until the sequence is
complete, it takes an average of nl trials to stumble upon the reward for the first time, where n is the
number of behaviours to choose from and l is the number of sequence steps. Because nl grows
exponentially with l, this entry pattern makes it nearly impossible to learn sequences longer than a
few steps. In contrast, it is easiest to learn the sequence backwards by starting at Sl, in which case,
each step takes about the same time to learn and the total learning time is linear in the length of the
sequence. This strategy is often used by animal trainers [75]. In nature, intermediate entry patterns are
common, in which sequences are entered from a mix of steps. In a famous case involving social
learning, black rats learn to open pine cones by having access, through their mother, to pine cones at
different stages of opening, such as cones with partly or fully exposed kernels. Rats that only
encounter whole cones, by contrast, never learn the feeding sequence [76–78]. More generally, parents
or other individuals can create favourable entry patterns by exposing learners to intermediate steps in
a sequence, which would be hard for the learner to reach on its own. Several terms that are
commonly used to describe social learning, such as local and stimulus enhancement, emulation and
opportunity providing, refer at least in part to ways in which social observations create different entry
patterns. For a full understanding of how various social situations can favour the learning of
behavioural sequences, simulations such as the one in figure 5 can be conducted.
3.5. Avoidance learning
In many species, predator recognition and avoidance is learned based on social signals such as warning calls
from conspecifics (for reviews, see [26,79]). Many authors have attributed this kind of social learning to the
establishment of an association between the predator stimulus and the warning stimulus [27,80,81], but we
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Figure 5. Social learning versus individual learning of a behaviour sequence. Panel (a) shows the probability of performing the
complete correct sequence starting from Sx (see text and table 1) as a function of number of learning opportunities, comparing
social and individual learning. Panel (b) shows that, in individual learning, the response to the second stimulus, Sy, is acquired
before the response to the first stimulus, Sx (backward chaining). In social learning, however, the order is reversed because
social stimuli facilitate the response to Sx. Panel (c) shows that social learning also lead to faster growth in w(Sy), the stimulus






danger does not allow for much error. A modification of the life/dinner principle [82] can illustrate the
special problem of learning about lethal stimuli; a young rabbit must learn at once to run for its life
while a young fox, however, can refine its dinner catching techniques over repeated attempts. For this
reason, we expect genetic guidance to be more important in predator recognition than, for example, in
food recognition. Here, we assume that the genes guide learning by endowing the warning stimulus
with a large negative value, u(Swarning) 0, while the predator stimulus is initially neutral, u(Spredator) ¼
0. The details of our simulation are as follows. In encounters with the predator, the learner is alone half
of the time and with an experienced animal the other half. The experienced animal, in turn, gives a
warning call half of the time it spots a predator. At each time step, one of three things may happen: the
predator leaves on its own (probability of 20%); the learner escapes through a suitable behavioural
response, such as burrowing; the learner ignores the predator. In real life, ignoring the predator may lead
to injury or death, but we do not model these possibilities explicitly because we are mainly interested in
comparing the speed of learning in the presence and absence of warning calls.
The results are illustrated in figure 6 and shows that inborn recognition of conspecific warning calls can
facilitate fast transmission of predator recognition between individuals. The key learning event is when the
learner ignores the predator and then hears the warning call, corresponding to the sequence Spredator!
Bignore! Swarning. In this event, the negative value of Swarning causes the association between Spredator and
Bignore to decrease, thus decreasing the probability that the predator will be ignored in the next
encounter. Moreover, in this event, the stimulus value w(Spredator) becomes negative because it precedes a
stimulus, Swarning, with negative value. This means that Spredator becomes capable of reinforcing escape
behaviour, because ignoring the predator results in the experience Spredator! Bignore! Spredator, in which
the negative value of the (second) predator stimulus reduces the S-R value of ignoring the predator.
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Figure 6. Social learning of predator avoidance through inborn recognition of a warning call. (a) The probability of escaping the
predator in social and individual learning. (b) The risk of injury as a function of number of predator encounters comparing social and
individual learning. (c) The underlying changes to memory for the social learning case. (d ) Changes in conditioned reinforcement





attacks. In the simulation, the attack simply punishes ignoring the predator, but in real life, the individual
may die before learning to avoid the predator.
Note that stimuli other than Spredator may become associated with the warning. For example, superb
fairy-wrens (Malurus cyaneus) can learn the warning calls of other species by associating them with the
conspecific warning call [83]. Such learning can occur if learners experience sequences such as Sx!
Bignore! Swarning, where Sx is the heterospecific warning call. The two calls, heterospecific and
conspecific, are likely to occur in this sequence at least some of the time, because they are both triggered
by the presence of the predator. If these experiences recur, Sx eventually acquires conditioned value
equal to the value of Swarning. That is, the outcome of learning is w(Sx) ¼ u(Swarning). This conditioned
value can then punish ignoring the predator when the heterospecific warning call is heard, that is, when
the sequence Spredator! Bignore! Sx is experienced. Thus, the learner now ‘understands’ heterospecific
as well as conspecific warning calls.
Our simulation is certainly simplified, yet offers an example of how associative learning may lead to
predator recognition based on a warning signal. In reality, avoidance of dangerous stimuli is probably
supported by further genetic predispositions. For example, it is important that the learner becomes
afraid of the predator and not of other surrounding objects, such as conspecifics or food items, that
may be present when the predator appears. This may, in principle, derive from discrimination
learning, because innocuous objects will not give rise to warning calls, but discrimination learning is
often time consuming. An alternative is that genetic predispositions bias learning towards stimulus
features that are probably diagnostic of predators, such as movement or a certain size. In addition,
there may be genetic predispositions such that the warning call itself has direct effects on behaviour,
such as increasing vigilance or priming a flight response.
4. Discussion
We have studied a few learning scenarios to demonstrate how social learning may arise based on a
combination of associative learning and genetic predispositions. Our analysis of social learning, like
other associative analyses (e.g. [18,27]), contrasts with descriptions of social learning that make no
reference to associative processes. Here, we explore whether these descriptions may be, in fact, amenable
to associative analysis. For definiteness, we consider the descriptive terms in table 2, which is based on a
recent, comprehensive monograph on social learning [11, table 4.1]. We divide these terms into three
groups: those referring to phenomena that can be explained by assuming prior learning or genetically
predisposed behaviour; those referring to phenomena that can be explained by learning of S-R (v values)
and stimulus values (w values); and those referring to phenomena that are more difficult to explain with
our associative learning model. The terms in table 2 are listed in the order in which they are covered below.
4.1. Terms accounted for by initial values or genetic predispositions
While potentially general, the term inadvertent coaching appears to have been used only for one kind of
observation, in which male brown-headed cowbirds (Molothrus ater) learn to modify their song based on
feedback from females [84,85]. In our model, such learning is possible if female behaviour acts to
reinforce the performance of some songs or song elements, but not others, thereby changing the S-R
values underlying song choice. In this case, the stimulus is the female, or some behaviour by the
female, and the response is the male’s song. Genetic specializations would determine the reward
value of female reactions to song, and, possibly, female responses to male song.
Terms social facilitation and response facilitation are often used without directly referring to learning. In
these cases, a particular behaviour is described as arising from the presence of other individuals or as a
response to the behaviour of another individual. For example, an animal may eat more in the presence of
others (see [86], for more examples). In our model, these outcomes can arise either as a consequence of
genetic predispositions or because of prior experience. Thus, frequently feeding with conspecifics can
result in the tendency to feed at a higher rate when in the presence of conspecifics, or in imitating
specific behaviours such as pecking in birds, because such behaviour can be rewarded with food. Social
facilitation is simpler to implement than response facilitation, because the naive individual only needs to
respond to the presence of another individual rather than to the other individuals’ behaviours. The
hypothesis that social and response facilitation arise from associative learning provides a useful
empirical perspective to study these phenomena. For example, it predicts that social and response





Similarly to social and response facilitation, the term contextual imitation refers to observations of
behaviour rather than to how the behaviour is learned. As seen in §3.2, contextual imitation may be
learned by associating the perception of a behaviour with the performance of the same behaviour,
resulting in such behaviours as pecking when others are pecking, or raising an arm when the
experimenter raises an arm. That contextual imitation can arise from associative learning is compatible
with it being taxonomically widespread [63,65,87–89]. Note, however, that our model can only repeat
actions one by one. It cannot first observe a sequence of more actions and then repeat it, because it
has no memory of past stimuli. We consider imitation of behavioural sequences in §4.3 below.
4.2. Terms accounted for by stimulus – response and stimulus value learning
Terms such as stimulus enhancement, local enhancement, opportunity providing and emulation represent
more interesting cases of social learning because they refer to situations in which animals, based on social
experiences, can learn new productive behaviour that they can later enact on their own. Based on our
analysis, it appears that these terms refer to phenomena within the scope of associative learning.
Stimulus and local enhancement describe situations in which a social stimulus affects the behaviour by
directing exploration towards a non-social stimulus or a location, respectively. In our model, this can
Table 2. Some terms used to describe social learning, adapted from Hoppitt & Laland [11]. Transfer learning refers to additional







inadvertent coaching feedback from experienced animal modifies
learner’s behaviour
no yes
social facilitation presence of experienced animal triggers learner
behaviour
no yes
response facilitation behaviour of experienced animal triggers
similar behaviour in learner
no yes
contextual imitation learner copies a familiar action displayed by
experienced animal
no yes
stimulus enhancement behaviour of experienced animal causes learner
to learn about a stimulus
yes yes
local enhancement behaviour of experienced animal causes learner
to learn about a location
yes yes
opportunity providing behaviour of experienced animal creates
favourable conditions for learning
yes yes
emulation learner uses outcomes of experienced animal’s





observations of experienced animal’s behaviour









observations of experienced animal’s behaviour
change S-R or R-S associations in the
learner
yes no
production imitation learner copies one or more unfamiliar actions






arise through transfer of value between the social stimulus and the non-social stimulus, as seen in §3.3. We
have assumed a primary reinforcer value for approach and exploratory behaviour towards social stimuli. It
is of course also possible that social stimuli, and responses to social stimuli, have acquired high values before
learning takes place through prior experiences; for example, through early interactions with parents and
other relatives. In emulation, the experienced animal obtains an outcome that the learner recognizes as
valuable, such as food. This can facilitate learning in two ways. First, it exposes the learner to a situation
in which the reward is more apparent and/or it can be obtained more easily. Second, perceiving the
reward can motivate behaviour that is generally useful to obtain that reward, such as exploration and
manipulation in the case of food (these effects can be included in our model as context-dependent action
selections, see Enquist et al. [28]). Once these facilitations are in place, learning can proceed through
associative learning (§3.4). Similar arguments hold for opportunity providing, in which the experienced
animal creates a situation conducive to learning. Opportunity providing can substantially speed up
learning and at the same time remain within the scope of associative learning. For example, many cat
species bring home live prey to their young to practice predation. Meerkats are even more sophisticated,
as they bring to their young scorpions that are progressively less disabled depending on the age of the
young [90]. While this behaviour may be labelled ‘teaching’ on the part of the parent, it is still
compatible with the young using associative learning.
Our model can also account for observational conditioning through the transfer of value from innately
recognized stimuli to other stimuli. For example, warning calls [91,92], warning substances [93] and
predator odours [94] often elicit innate anti-predator behaviour. In social learning of predator
recognition, these innately recognized stimuli co-occur with the stimuli to be learned about, namely, the
sight, sound or smell of predators, and can thus reinforce learning of predator avoidance (§3.5). This
scenario appears consistent with empirical examples of predator recognition, such as in blackbirds
(Turdus merula, [1]), rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta, [81,95]) and prairie dogs (Cynomys ludovicianus,
[96]). Social enhancement of food preferences can also develop through exposure to compound stimuli,
assuming that experiencing a novel smell on a familiar individual reinforces exploration of the smell
when experienced on its own.
While some of our simulations tracked only S-R values for simplicity, stimulus value learning is
equally important in many social learning scenarios. For example, when a young chimpanzee
observes her mother using stones to crack nuts, her experiences include closed nuts and stones
predicting the availability of open nuts. We thus expect closed nuts and stones to acquire conditioned
value [97], and thereby the ability to reinforce exploration and manipulation of nuts and stones that is
conducive to mastering nut cracking [28]. The predator recognition scenario discussed above provides
another example of the potential role of stimulus value learning: as predator recognition progresses,
stimuli associated with predators are predicted to acquire negative value, and thus can reinforce
avoidance of locations or stimuli that are correlated with encountering predators.
4.3. Terms not accounted for by our associative learning model
There are two main social learning phenomena that are commonly discussed, but which our model does not
exhibit. The first is observational learning of S-R and response–stimulus (R-S) associations. The second is
production imitation, also called true imitation, which refers to learning new behavioural skills purely by
observation [8,98,99]. In our model, observational learning is not possible because S-R associations
(v values) can change only when the learner itself performs the response. Merely observing an
experienced animal performing a response does not change S-R associations in the learner. Our model,
however, can produce a weaker form of observational learning, in which observing the sequence Sx! B
! Sreward performed by another individual can result in faster learning, albeit not immediate. For
example, suppose that the learner has already learned to imitate B and assume further that observation of
the sequence Sx! B is perceived by the learner as the compound stimulus Sx[B], for example, because Sx
and [B] partly overlap in time. Because of the established imitation, the compound Sx[B] will evoke B in
the learner. If B is followed by Sreward, then the learner will have experienced the sequence Sx[B]! B!
Sreward, resulting in the growth of the S-R association v(Sx! B) as seen in §3.3. Additionally, observations
of the form Sx[B]! Sreward results in Sx and [B] acquiring stimulus value, and thus reinforce exploration,
approach and other behaviour that may be conducive to learning B in response to Sx.
Turning to observational learning of R-S associations, we note first that these associations refer to the
knowledge that a given behaviour (R) results in a given outcome (S). Because the outcomes of behaviour
depend typically on the situation, these associations are perhaps better described as S-R-S0 information,





value of responses, but not about their specific outcomes. Distinguishing between knowing the value of
responding to S with R and knowing the full S-R-S0 information is complex and related to the open
question of what associations are formed during instrumental learning [15,35]. We leave this issue to
future work, and here we simply remark again that our model does not learn responses by mere
observation. Should compelling evidence for observational learning be gathered, the model would
need to be revised.
Production imitation is more complex than observational learning because it may involve sequences of
actions rather than single actions. Thus, in addition to observational learning of actions, production
imitation requires a faithful memory of sequences of observations. The extent to which animals are
capable of production imitation is debated and resolving this issue is not our present aim. Some studies
with chimpanzees [20,67,100], parrots [101] and dogs [102] have demonstrated some degree of motor
imitation after extensive training, but the fidelity of imitation is not high. That imitation of behavioural
sequences should be difficult for animals is suggested by studies of working memory, indicating that
memory for stimulus sequences is much poorer in most non-human species than in humans [103]. In our
model, social observations can facilitate behavioural sequence learning (§3.4), but immediate imitation is
prevented by the lack of observational learning and of a memory for sequences.
The debate on both production and contextual imitation is intimately tied with the correspondence
problem (§2.1). Our model does not contain a dedicated mechanism to solve the correspondence
problem (§2.3), yet we saw in §3.2 that the ability to imitate can be learned for specific behaviours. It
is possible to develop this account to obtain a more general ability to imitate, by assuming that
extensive training can establish very many specific imitative responses, which may form the basis for
imitating novel behaviours through stimulus and motor generalization. Stimulus generalization may
enable the parsing of observations of novel movements in terms of known motor elements, and motor
generalization may enable the construction of novel movements by assembling the known motor
elements that have been observed. For example, let B1 stand for ‘raise arm’ and B2 for ‘open hand’.
Learning to imitate these behaviours would lead to stimulus [B1] evoking B1 and to stimulus [B2]
evoking B2 (§3.2). Then the observation of another individual simultaneously raising her arm and
opening her hand would give rise to the compound stimulus [B1][B2], which through generalization
could recruit both responses B1 and B2. While a full computational implementation of this idea is not
trivial, this perspective is compatible with the finding that learning of general imitation, to the extent
that it succeeds, requires extensive training [20,100–102]. A testable prediction of this account is that
imitation abilities, even if extensive, should be limited to novel movements that can be effectively
decomposed in terms of trained movements.
4.4. Conclusion
Our results illustrate that a diversity of social learning phenomena can arise from associative mechanisms, as
formalized in our genetically guided associative learning model [28]. Associative learning may thus provide a
unified account of social learning phenomena that are often treated as separate. Our results also indicate that
social learning may rely on the same mechanisms as individual learning, with adaptive specializations for
social learning implemented as genetic predispositions in perceptual, motivational and reward systems,
rather than as distinct learning mechanisms. This perspective is appealing from an evolutionary point of
view, as it makes it possible for social learning to evolve by fine-tuning associative learning to a species’
social and environmental circumstances, without requiring the evolution of new learning mechanisms. For
example, it has been suggested that dogs have evolved to find social stimuli more salient and rewarding
than their wolf ancestors [104,105]. Thus, it may not be necessary for social species to have specific social
learning mechanisms, as members of social species have naturally more social learning opportunities than
members of solitary species. An associative perspective on social learning also suggests that animals do
not inherit social learning strategies such as ‘copy successful individuals’ [106], but that such strategies
may be learned based on environmental circumstances [107]. For example, an animal may learn to copy
the best foragers because doing so is reinforced more often than copying poor foragers.
Our conclusions are similar to those reached by Cecilia Heyes, whose work has been an important
source of inspiration for us [25,27,107]. For example, our account of imitation as learned S-R associations
is an implementation of Heyes’ approach to the correspondence problem. The main difference between
Heyes’ work and ours is that our model contains fewer learning processes. For example, Heyes’ theory of
social learning includes observational learning [25,27], while in our model responses can be learned only
by performing them. A similar remark applies to Heyes and Ray’s [108] associative sequence learning





between behaviours and perceptions of behaviour, as we explored in §3.2. A behavioural sequence can then
be learned by remembering the sequence of perceived behaviours and performing for each one the
associated behaviour. We have not included this mechanism in our model because sequential memory
appears poor in most animals [103], and because we wished to explore a simpler alternative (§3.4). Even
without observational learning and a sequential memory, our model is powerful enough to learn
relatively long behavioural sequences, such as those seen in primate tool use [28].
More generally, our model holds that behavioural sequence learning depends on stimulus value
learning and S-R learning, in concert with genetic predispositions. Overall, this picture agrees with
both traditional analysis of behaviour chains in behaviourist psychology [48,72] and with data from
more naturalistic settings. For example, Tomasello [97] notes that chimpanzees learn readily about the
value of objects manipulated by others, but not about the specific behaviours that others perform.
Likewise, in her pioneering work on animal culture, Goodall ([110, p. 561]) summarized chimpanzee
learning of tool use as ‘a mixture of social facilitation, observation, imitation, and practice—with a
good deal of trial and error learning thrown in’. Given that imitation of specific acts can arise from
associative learning (§3.2), Goodall’s account is close to our conclusions. We emphasize that it is not
possible to discriminate between our model and alternative accounts without knowledge of an
animal’s prior experiences ([15, p. 306] and [31,60]). For example, an imitative behaviour might be
genetically predisposed, it might be learned based on observation, or it might be learned by standard
instrumental learning as in our model (§3.2). As the final outcome is identical (imitation), only
information about prior experience can distinguish between these possibilities.
To end, we concur with Heyes [27] that ‘the suggestion that social learning is mediated by associative
processes does not imply that all learning is associative’. In animals, exceptions exist in systems with
strong genetic support, such as in song learning in hummingbirds, passerines and parrots [111]. In human
social learning, mechanisms beyond associative learning have been suggested numerous times (e.g.
[112,113]). In both cases, quantitative associative models can provide at least a null hypothesis to test the
existence of other social learning mechanisms. The study of social learning naturally touches upon crucial
issues in animal cognition, behavioural ecology, development and learning theory, providing numerous
exciting opportunities for rigorous study using formal learning models, whether associative or not.
Data accessibility. Data and graphs from our simulations can be generated using software and code as specified in the
electronic supplementary material.
Authors’ contributions. J.L., S.G. and M.E. conceived the research, performed computer simulations, analysed the data and
wrote the manuscript. All authors gave final approval for publication.
Competing interests. We declare we have no competing interests.
Funding. J.L., S.G. and M.E. have been supported by grant no. 2015.0005 from the Knut and Alice Wallenberg
Foundation. S.G. was additionally supported by a CUNY Graduate Center fellowship from the Committee for
Interdisciplinary Studies.
Acknowledgements. The authors thank Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation for support. We also wish to thank three
anonymous reviewers.
References
1. Curio E, Ernst U, Vieth W. 1978 Cultural
transmission of enemy recognition: one function
of mobbing. Science 202, 899 – 901. (doi:10.
1126/science.202.4370.899)
2. Galef BG Jr. 1996 Social enhancement of food
preferences in Norway rats: a brief review. In
Social learning in animals: the roots of culture
(eds C Heyes, BG Galef Jr). San Diego, CA:
Academic Press.
3. Thornton A, Clutton-Brock T. 2011 Social
learning and the development of individual and
group behaviour in mammal societies. Phil.
Trans. R. Soc. B 366, 978 – 987. (doi:10.1098/
rstb.2010.0312)
4. Galef Jr BG. 1992 The question of animal
culture. Hum. Nat. 3, 157 – 178. (doi:10.1007/
BF02692251)
5. Cavalli Sforza LL, Feldman MW. 1981 Cultural
transmission and evolution: a quantitative
approach. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
6. Boyd R, Richerson PJ. 1995 Why does culture
increase human adaptability? Ethol. Sociobiol.
16, 125 – 143. (doi:10.1016/0162-
3095(94)00073-G)
7. Heyes CM, Galef Jr BG. 1996 Social learning in
animals: the roots of culture. San Diego, CA:
Academic Press.
8. Tomasello M. 1999 The cultural origins of
human cognition. London, UK: Harvard
University Press.
9. Richerson PJ, Boyd R. 2005 Not by genes alone:
how culture transformed human evolution.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
10. Sterelny K. 2012 The evolved apprentice.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
11. Hoppitt W, Laland KN. 2013 Social learning: an
introduction to mechanisms, methods, and
models. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
12. Whiten A. 2015 Experimental studies illuminate
the cultural transmission of percussive
technologies in Homo and Pan. Phil. Trans. R. Soc.
B 370, 20140359. (doi:10.1098/rstb.2014.0359)
13. Galef Jr BG. 1988 Imitations in animals: history,
definitions, and interpretations of data from the
psychological laboratory. In Social learning:
Psychological and Biological Perspectives (eds TR
Zentell, BG Galef Jr), pp. 3 – 28. Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
14. Whiten A, Ham R. 1992 On the nature and
evolution of imitation in the animal kingdom:
reappraisal of a century of research. Adv. Stud.
Behav. 21, 239 – 283. (doi:10.1016/S0065-
3454(08)60146-1)
15. Pearce JM. 2008 Animal learning and cognition,





16. Wynn T, McGrew WC. 1989 An ape’s view of the
Oldowan. Man 24, 383 – 398. (doi:10.2307/
2802697)
17. Wynn T, Hernandez-Aguilar RA, Marchant LF,
Mcgrew WC. 2011 ‘An ape’s view of the
Oldowan’ revisited. Evol. Anthropol. 20,
181 – 197. (doi:10.1002/evan.20323)
18. Leadbeater E. 2015 What evolves in the
evolution of social learning? J. Zool. 295, 4 – 11.
(doi:10.1111/jzo.2015.295.issue-1)
19. Hogan JA. 2017 The study of behavior:
organization, methods, and principles.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
20. Custance D, Whiten A, Bard K. 1995 Can young
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) imitate arbitrary
actions? Hayes and Hayes (1952) revisited.
Behaviour 132, 837 – 859. (doi:10.1163/
156853995X00036)
21. Horner V, Whiten A. 2005 Causal knowledge
and imitation/emulation switching in
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and children
(Homo sapiens). Anim. Cogn. 8, 164 – 181.
(doi:10.1007/s10071-004-0239-6)
22. Galef BG Jr, Giraldeau LA. 2001 Social influences
on foraging in vertebrates: causal mechanisms
and adaptive functions. Anim. Behav. 61, 3 – 15.
(doi:10.1006/anbe.2000.1557)
23. Zentall TR. 2011 Perspectives on observational
learning in animals. J. Comp. Psychol. 126,
114 – 128. (doi:10.1037/a0025381)
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